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THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL AND CLOSING 
THE COURTROOM TO DISRUPTIVE 
SPECTATORS 
STEPHEN E. SMITH

 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in 
part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial.”
1
 Like many constitutional rights, however, 
the right to a public trial is not absolute.
2
 Courtrooms may be closed to the 
public in some situations.
3
 In Waller v. Georgia,
4
 the Supreme Court set 
forth the test trial courts should apply to determine whether a courtroom 
closure is appropriate.
5
 However, some courts, led by the Second Circuit’s 
per curiam decision in Cosentino v. Kelly,
6
 have declined to apply the 
Waller test to closures ordered for the purpose of excluding “disruptive” 
audience members in the courtroom.
7
  
The exception of these “disruptive” courtroom closures from the 
Waller test is unnecessary and unsupported for several reasons. First, 
nothing in Waller or the Court’s subsequent right to a public trial case, 
Presley v. Georgia,
8
 indicates that the test applies in only limited 
circumstances.
9
 Second, cases declining to apply Waller’s test in these 
instances do not adequately explain why they believe the test has an 
exception at all.
10
 The Waller test properly balances Sixth Amendment 
values against the need for decorum and accounts for the serious nature of 
courtroom closures.
11
 Finally, the Waller test is easily administered by a 
trial court in effecting a courtroom closure, including those courtroom 
 
 
  Associate Clinical Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. I am grateful to the 
members of the law review for their thoughtful feedback and editing.  
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 2. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984). 
 3. See, e.g., United States v. Akers, 542 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (“The court 
had been advised that the proceedings would be disrupted if the verdict were unfavorable to the 
appellants. The court could properly conclude that the threat of harm dictated partial closing of the 
proceedings.”). 
 4. 467 U.S. at 48. 
 5. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 6. 102 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam).  
 7. See infra notes 44–63 and accompanying text. 
 8. 558 U.S. 209 (2010) (per curiam). 
 9. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 54–65 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 67–71 and accompanying text. 
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closures that exclude disruptive spectators.
12
 This anomaly in the rules 
governing courtroom closures should be eliminated. 
THE WALLER TEST AND COURTROOM CLOSURES 
The Sixth Amendment’s right to a public trial manifests “[t]he 
traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials.”
13
 A violation of the 
right to a public trial is considered “structural” and thus not subject to 
harmless error review.
14
 The right to a public trial extends to many aspects 
of the trial, from voir dire
15
 to sentencing.
16
 Moreover, Waller held that 
the right to a public trial applies to suppression hearings.
17
 The right to a 
public trial also applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
due process guarantee.
18
 Overall, the right to a public trial may yield to 
other rights or interests, but only in rare circumstances, and “the balance of 
interests must be struck with special care.”
19
 
Waller is the leading Supreme Court case on the Sixth Amendment’s 
right to a public trial and courtroom closures.
20
 In Waller, the defendants 
were charged with violating Georgia’s gambling laws.
21
 Much of the 
prosecution’s case in chief revolved around wiretap evidence; the 
defendants moved to suppress this evidence.
22
 Following the defendants’ 
motion, the prosecution moved to close the suppression hearing to the 
public.
23
 The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion, closing the 
suppression hearing “to all persons other than witnesses, court personnel, 
the parties, and the lawyers.”
24
 The trial court reasoned that if the hearing 
 
 
 12. See infra notes 71–88 and accompanying text. 
 13. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268 (1948). 
 14. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 
(1984)). 
 15. See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 213 (2010). 
 16. See United States v. Rivera, 682 F.3d 1223, 1237 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 17. Waller, 467 U.S. at 43. 
 18. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273. 
 19. Waller, 467 U.S. at 45. 
 20. Of course, standards by which the propriety of a courtroom closure could be measured 
existed years before the Supreme Court’s Waller decision. For instance, five years before Waller, the 
Ninth Circuit approved a courtroom closure because the closure was “reasonably limited to the 
circumstances for which it was invoked.” United States v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741, 748 (9th Cir. 
1979) (affirming court order closing the courtroom to the public, which was primarily issued to protect 
a witness and his family from “harassment and physical harm”). 
 21. Waller, 467 U.S. at 41. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id.   
 24. Id. at 42. 
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were open to the public, “insofar as the wiretap evidence related to alleged 
offenders not then on trial, the evidence would be tainted and could not be 
used in future prosecutions.”
25
 The Georgia Supreme Court reviewed the 
trial court’s order and held that the closure comported with the Sixth 
Amendment.
26
 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court’s order was 
improper because “the trial court failed to give proper weight to Sixth 
Amendment concerns.”
27
 The Court noted that a courtroom closure must 
meet a four-part test to properly comply with the Sixth Amendment: 
[1] the party seeking to close the [proceeding] must advance an 
overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [2] the closure 
must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, [3] the 
trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the 
proceeding, and [4] it must make findings adequate to support the 
closure.
28
 
The Waller test is rigorous.
29
 While no court has explicitly stated so, the 
test is in the nature of “strict scrutiny” review.
30
 Like other government 
actions reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard, the government must 
demonstrate a strong interest, along with a solution applied that has been 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
31
  
The Waller test has been applied not only to complete closures of trial 
proceedings, but also to partial closures of court proceedings (e.g., 
closures for certain portions of a proceeding and closures to certain 
individuals).
32
 Most courts have applied a slightly different version of the 
Waller test to partial closures.
33
 While three of the four Waller factors 
 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 43. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. at 48 (adopting test from a courtroom closure case arising under the First Amendment, 
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 511–12 (1984)). 
 29. Johnson v. Sherry, 586 F.3d 439, 447 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 30. Cf. In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(citing Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 509–11, and observing that “[t]he Supreme Court has most 
recently spoken as if closure orders must meet the test of strict scrutiny”). 
 31. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800 (2006) (explaining strict scrutiny as a two-
factor inquiry, requiring that “the governmental ends are compelling” and “the law is a narrowly 
tailored means of furthering those governmental interests”).  
 32. See, e.g., State v. Turrietta, 308 P.3d 964, 967 (N.M. 2013).  
 33. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 797 F.3d 409, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) 
(“Nearly all federal courts of appeals . . . have distinguished between the total closure of proceedings 
and situations in which a courtroom is only partially closed to certain spectators.”). 
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remain unchanged when a court reviews a partial closure, these courts 
provide that in a partial closure case an “overriding interest” need not be 
shown; instead, they require only a “substantial reason.”
34
 “[T]he 
difference between the two standards is not perfectly clear, other than the 
fact that the reviewing court knows that the ‘substantial reason’ standard is 
a more lenient standard than the ‘overriding interest’ standard.”
35
 The 
“modified” Waller test used in partial closure cases hews very closely to 
Waller in its original form.
36
 It simply minimizes the showing necessary 
under Waller’s first factor. 
In 2010, the Supreme Court revisited the right to a public trial in 
Presley v. Georgia.
37
 In Presley, the trial court closed the courtroom 
during jury selection, believing that there was not enough room in the 
courtroom to accommodate spectators.
38
 The Georgia Supreme Court held 
that the closure comported with the Sixth Amendment’s requirements, 
noting, in particular, that the trial court had no sua sponte duty to 
investigate reasonable alternatives to closure.
39
 On appeal, however, the 
US Supreme Court held that the closure was improper.
40
 The Court 
reiterated that Waller set forth the appropriate test for evaluating 
courtroom closures.
41
 The Court indicated that the “overriding interest” 
asserted must be specific and substantiated,
42
 and held that the required 
 
 
 34. See, e.g., Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying “substantial reason” 
test); Commonwealth v. Downey, 936 N.E.2d 442, 449 n.12 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (citing 
Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 921 N.E.2d 906, 921 (Mass. 2010)) (“When a closure is partial, a 
‘substantial reason’ rather than an ‘overriding interest’ may suffice to justify the closure.”). But see 
Turrietta, 308 P.3d at 967 (holding Waller’s “overriding interest” factor applies in partial closures 
excluding only some courtroom spectators); People v. Jones, 750 N.E.2d 524, 529 (N.Y. 2001) 
(holding, in the partial closure context, that “[w]hen the procedure requested impacts on a defendant’s 
right to a public trial, nothing less than an overriding interest can satisfy constitutional scrutiny”). 
 35. Turrieta, 308 P.3d at 970. For purposes of this discussion, it is unnecessary to establish the 
relative showings that must be made under each standard. 
 36. See Simmons, 797 F.3d at 414 (“All federal courts of appeals that have distinguished between 
partial closures and total closures modify the Waller test so that the ‘overriding interest’ requirement is 
replaced by requiring a showing of a ‘substantial reason’ for a partial closure, but the other three 
factors remain the same.”). 
 37. 558 U.S. 209, 209 (2010). 
 38. Id. at 210. 
 39. Id. at 211 (quoting Presley v. State, 674 S.E.2d 909, 912 (2009), rev’d, 558 U.S. 209 (2010), 
vacated, 695 S.E.2d 268 (2010)). 
 40. Id. at 216. 
 41. Id. at 213–14. 
 42. Id. at 215–16; accord Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984) (criticizing certain findings 
as insufficient because they were “broad and general”). Presley makes no mention of closures as 
“partial” or “complete.” 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss1/11
  
 
 
 
 
2015] THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL 239 
 
 
 
 
findings should also include specific findings of “reasonable alternatives” 
to closure, which the court must make sua sponte.
43
  
THE COSENTINO EXCEPTION—DECLINING TO APPLY WALLER TO 
CLOSURES EXCLUDING DISRUPTIVE AUDIENCE MEMBERS 
Despite the test set forth in Waller and reiterated in Presley, some 
courts have concluded that Waller’s right to a public trial analysis is not 
implicated when objectionable spectators are excluded from trial. The 
seminal case is Cosentino v. Kelly.
44
 
In Cosentino, a guilty verdict resulted in “bedlam”: 
[T]here were a great many members of the [petitioners’] family, 
friends here, I say 10 to 15 and not all of them but a good many of 
them just went absolutely off the wall yelling and screaming, 
several had to be physically restrained, taken out of the courtroom, 
we had quite a scene here. As I indicated to the jury, one unlike any 
that I’ve ever seen or the attorneys have ever seen, as they indicated 
to me.
45
 
After substantial motion practice by both sides that referenced the 
disturbance, the trial court declared a mistrial, and a second trial was 
held.
46
 The trial judge excluded from the second trial some of the family 
members who had participated in the earlier disruption.
47
 On appeal, the 
appellants contended that the closure of the courtroom to the family 
members violated their rights to a public trial.
48
 The Second Circuit wrote 
that the disruption the spectators had caused in the courtroom was 
“something more than a breach of decorum,”
49
 instead reaching the level 
of “pandemonium [which] had directly caused a mistrial.”
50
 The court 
concluded that the need for an orderly trial outweighed the need for 
 
 
 43. Presley, 558 U.S. at 214 (“[T]rial courts are required to consider alternatives to closure even 
when they are not offered by the parties . . . .”). 
 44. 102 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam). 
 45. Id. at 72 (quoting the trial transcript). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 71. 
 49. Id. at 73. 
 50. Id. 
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access,
51
 and stated that it would not perform a Waller analysis because it 
believed that the Waller standard “governs the closing of the courtroom to 
peaceable individuals or to the public at large.”
52
 Some subsequent cases, 
in and out of the Second Circuit, have repeated this sentiment.
53
  
THE REASONING OF COSENTINO AND ITS PROGENY 
Cosentino is a per curiam decision, appearing over a scant three pages 
of the Federal Reporter. The case provides little reasoning to support the 
dramatic cabining of the Waller test’s applicability to only closures of 
courtrooms to “peaceable individuals or to the public at large.”
54
 
The Cosentino court noted that the right to a public trial “has always 
been interpreted as being subject to the trial judge’s power to keep order in 
the courtroom.”
55
 Cosentino quotes two cases that support the proposition 
that courtroom decorum is important. The first case, United States ex rel. 
Orlando v. Fay,
56
 noted that when the public trial right is weighed against 
the need to deter indecorous behavior, a court must balance “the 
requirement that the actions of the courts be open to public scrutiny and 
the need to have the trial proceed in an orderly manner.”
57
 In the second 
case, Illinois v. Allen,
58
 the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he flagrant 
disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct 
should not and cannot be tolerated.”
59
 Each of these cases set forth an 
important governmental interest:  the need for order in the court. Neither 
case, however, says anything about whether the Waller test should apply 
in the situation the court in Cosentino addressed. Nor could it—each case 
predates Waller. 
The courts following Cosentino down its path have fared little better in 
providing reasoning to support limiting Waller’s application to 
 
 
 51. Id. The Second Circuit concluded that the trial judge “struck a scrupulous ‘balance between 
the requirement that the actions of the courts be open to public scrutiny and the need to have the trial 
proceed in an orderly manner.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967, 971 (2d Cir. 1965)). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See, e.g., Shepard v. Artuz, No. 99 CIV.1912 (DC), 2000 WL 423519, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
19, 2000); State v. Sowell, No. 06AP-443, 2008 WL 2600222, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 2008). 
But see Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 945 N.E.2d 313, 325 n.15 (Mass. 2011) (rejecting Cosentino and 
applying the Waller test). 
 54. Cosentino, 102 F.3d at 73. 
 55. Id. (quoting Fay, 350 F.2d at 971). 
 56. Fay, 350 F.2d 967. 
 57. Id. at 971. 
 58. 397 U.S. 337 (1970). 
 59. Id. at 343. 
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“peaceable” audience members. For instance, Shepard v. Artuz simply 
relies on Cosentino to reach its conclusion that it need not undertake a 
Waller analysis.
60
 Similarly, State v. Sowell cites to both Cosentino and 
Shepard to conclude that Waller need not be applied, simply adopting 
those cases’ assertions.
61
 
Two other courts have also adopted Cosentino as authoritative, citing 
it, without further analysis, for the proposition that the Waller factors need 
not be considered in the case of disruptive audience members.
62
 Only one 
court has explicitly rejected, without significant discussion, Cosentino’s 
assertion that Waller does not apply in cases of disruption.
63
 Many other 
courts have applied Waller, or its modified version often applied to partial 
closures, in cases of disruption, without any discussion of Cosentino or 
suggestion that Waller might not apply.
64
 
Cosentino does not say “anything goes” in terms of closing the 
courtroom to disruptive spectators. It requires some sort of showing, if 
only a somewhat nebulous balancing of the right to a public trial against 
the need for order in the courtroom.
65
 It is unclear, however, why 
Cosentino determined that this showing should deviate from Waller. The 
facts in Cosentino likely satisfied the Waller test, but perhaps the court 
was concerned that the trial court had made inadequate findings, and 
believed that for the verdict to survive, it had to carve out an exception to 
Waller. 
 
 
 60. Shepard v. Artuz, No. 99 CIV.1912 (DC), 2000 WL 423519, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2000) 
(citing Cosentino and declining to apply Waller factors in a habeas proceeding when the state court 
barred petitioner’s “mother from the courtroom only after a court officer had seen her make 
threatening gestures at the prosecution witness in open court”). Neither Shepard nor Harvey v. 
Headley, No. 98 CIV. 8660 (MBM), 2001 WL 755386 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2001), can be impugned, of 
course, for following Cosentino, as each case arose within the Second Circuit. 
 61. State v. Sowell, No. 06AP-443, 2008 WL 2600222, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 2008) 
(citing Cosentino and Shepard and stating that “when the exclusion is based on misconduct by the 
spectator, the Waller test does not apply”). Sowell also relies, in part, on the separate Sixth 
Amendment doctrine of “triviality” to resolve the question before it. Id. at *8–*11. That doctrine, 
however, is unrelated to the specific question of disruptive spectators. 
 62. See Harvey, 2001 WL 755386, at *3 n.2 (“[The Waller] test need not be satisfied here 
because Harvey’s children were disruptive and the courtroom was otherwise open to the public.”); 
People v. Shepard, 243 A.D.2d 290, 290 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (citations omitted) (“The ejection was 
based on the actual misconduct of the spectator in open court and the court’s responsibility to maintain 
order. In such circumstances, the test for courtroom closure set forth in Waller . . . does not apply.”). 
 63. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 945 N.E.2d 313, 325 n.15 (Mass. 2011). 
 64. See, e.g., United States v. Laureano-Perez, 797 F.3d 45, 78 (1st Cir. 2015) (applying Waller 
test to disruptive spectator closure); United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); 
People v. Cooper, 849 N.E.2d 142 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (same). 
 65. See Cosentino v. Kelly, 102 F.3d 71, 73 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. 
Fay, 350 F.2d 967, 971 (2d Cir. 1965)). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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THE WALLER TEST SHOULD APPLY TO CLOSURES EXCLUDING  
DISRUPTIVE SPECTATORS 
For three reasons, Waller should be applied to assess the propriety of 
courtroom closures to disruptive spectators. First, the language of Waller 
does not support an exception for disruptive spectators. Second, the 
purposes of the right to a public trial are fulfilled by applying Waller 
scrutiny to closures excluding disruptive spectators. Third, the Waller test 
is easily administered in cases presenting disruptive spectators. Waller 
provides a consistent, uniform test for trial judges to apply before closing 
their courtrooms. 
First, as a threshold matter, Waller does not support a disruptive 
spectator exception. There is no question that Cosentino’s facts, involving 
dramatic upheaval in the courtroom, are distinct from the facts in Waller, 
where no disruption occurred. But there is equally no question that neither 
Waller nor Presley purport to limit their holdings to a certain class of 
excluded persons. Indeed, Waller’s language is to the contrary. The Court 
writes, “we hold that under the Sixth Amendment any closure of a 
suppression hearing over the objections of the accused must meet the tests 
set out” in the Court’s opinion.
66
  
Second, to serve the purposes of the right to a public trial, the Waller 
test should extend to all court spectators. Two purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to a public trial are to “ensure a fair trial” and “remind 
the prosecutor and judge of their responsibility to the accused and the 
importance of their functions.”67 To further these purposes, trial judges 
should err on the side of including, rather than excluding, the people most 
invested in the outcome of criminal trials: family and friends. Their 
presence allows them to scrutinize the proceedings, and lets the prosecutor 
and judge know that the accused’s fate affects more than the accused 
alone.
68
 
The scalpel provided by Waller properly serves the Sixth 
Amendment’s public trial guarantee as opposed to the hammer Cosentino 
equips trial judges with. A blanket rule excluding “disruptive” spectators 
ignores human nature and eliminates any locus poenitentiae for those 
court spectators. The accused is entitled to have friends and family 
 
 
 66. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 47 (1984) (emphasis added). 
 67. Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Waller, 467 U.S. at 46–47). 
 68. See United States v. Rivera, 682 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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members present in the courtroom,
69
 and in many cases family members 
will be disruptive.
70
 It is hard to imagine a criminal case resulting in 
anything other than emotional pain for the accused’s family, and it is 
unreasonable to expect the family not to give a voice to that emotional 
pain. Trial courts should reasonably expect exclamation from loved ones. 
Without the rigor of Waller review, a trial judge may simply point to 
any response or reaction, declare the responsible parties “non-peaceable,” 
and exclude them from future proceedings. For instance, an outburst 
following a jury verdict, presumably an unfavorable one for the spectator, 
may cause the trial judge to label the spectator as disruptive. This, in turn, 
may lead to the spectator’s exclusion from post-trial proceedings such as 
sentencing. Sentencing is perhaps the second most momentous event in a 
criminal proceeding and thus a bar to such a proceeding would be 
significant. Sentencing is a point at which prosecutors and judges need to 
be particularly “remind[ed] . . . of their responsibility to the accused.”71 
Permitting a cursory exclusion of interested spectators is at odds with this 
Sixth Amendment value. 
Under Waller, on the other hand, the circumstances must be considered 
with greater sensitivity. A family member’s outburst would be considered 
at the “overriding interest” or “substantial reason” phase of the Waller test, 
but the possibility that those family members might be able to restrain 
themselves in later proceedings would simultaneously have to be 
considered under Waller’s “narrow tailoring” and “alternatives” factors. 
Moreover, Waller mandates detailed findings from the trial court, 
requiring the trial judge to reflect rather than simply react. By ensuring 
that interested spectators and their actions are considered carefully before 
they are excluded, Waller respects the importance of the right to a public 
trial in a way Cosentino does not. 
Finally, the Waller test is easily administered and may be applied in the 
same way it would apply in any other closure situation. There is nothing 
inherently different in the “disruptive spectator” context that necessitates 
abandoning the Waller test in favor of a more cursory analysis. A 
discussion of the administrability of each factor demonstrates this. 
The first factor requires the court to find an “overriding interest” or 
“substantial reason” for the closure. Depending on the nature of the 
disruption, an “overriding interest,” or “substantial reason,” may be found. 
 
 
 69. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271–72 (1948) (“[W]ithout exception all courts have held that an 
accused is at the very least entitled to have his friends, relatives and counsel present . . . .”). 
 70. See, e.g., People v. Cooper, 849 N.E.2d 142, 144 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). 
 71. Peterson, 85 F.3d at 43. 
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Courtroom decorum can undoubtedly constitute an interest sufficient to 
justify a closure.
72
 For instance, in People v. Cooper, members of the 
courtroom audience made “audible sounds and tisks and disagree[d] 
audibly and loudly with the witnesses.”
73
 The defendant did not contest 
that “maintaining proper courtroom decorum is an overriding interest.”
74
  
Other cases have also found courtroom disorder sufficient to justify 
closures.
75
  
Conversely, situations will arise when an asserted disruption is not 
great enough to satisfy the “overriding interest” or “substantial reason” 
factors.
76
 This is exactly why the Waller test should apply in a 
“disruption” situation. The need for action should be carefully considered, 
rather than quickly settled with an unconsidered incantation of 
“disruption.” It cannot be true that any disruption can lead to closure and 
exclusion. Waller provides the framework within which the gravity of the 
disruption and propriety of response can be evaluated.  
The other Waller factors may also be easily processed in case of a 
courtroom disruption. Waller’s second factor requires that “the closure 
must be no broader than necessary.”
77
 In the case of spectator disruption, 
this factor appears to require little more than identifying the particular 
spectators the court seeks to exclude. 
The third factor mandates that “the trial court must consider reasonable 
alternatives to closing the proceeding.”
78
 Admittedly, there are few 
“reasonable alternatives” in a disruption case. A spectator can and should 
be warned to end her behavior and be offered an ultimatum—respect court 
 
 
 72. See Cooper, 849 N.E.2d at 146. 
 73. Id. at 144. 
 74. Id. at 146. 
 75. See, e.g., United States v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967, 971 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding that a partial 
closure of a courtroom was not unreasonable “when it became apparent that both in and out of the 
courtroom the defendant and his sympathizers were attempting to prevent the orderly presentation of 
the case”); Edwards v. Brown, No. 10-CIV-6475 (NRB), 2011 WL 5920901, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 
2011) (finding that a “fracas” between a witness and the defendant’s family members was sufficient to 
justify a partial closure of the courtroom); Waller v. United States, No. 1:08-CV-936 (1:04-CR-13), 
2010 WL 750219, at *8, *10 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2010) (finding that family member outbursts, 
including yelling that a witness was “lying,” were sufficient to justify a partial closure of the 
courtroom). In fact, this point was settled before Waller was decided. See United States v. Akers, 542 
F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (holding that a partial closure of a courtroom in order “to 
avoid disorder” was proper). 
 76. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 797 F.3d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that trial 
court’s finding of a “possibility” of witness intimidation “did not reach the conclusion necessary to 
satisfy the first prong of the modified Waller test”). 
 77. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984). 
 78. Id. 
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decorum or face exclusion.
79
 Should the spectator decline to acquiesce, 
exclusion is the only recourse. The administrative burden on the court is 
necessarily minimal. Offering the second-chance, stay-quietly-or-go 
ultimatum may be an extra step, but it seems like a small one to require 
when a constitutional guarantee is at issue. 
Finally, the fourth Waller factor requires the court to “make findings 
adequate to support the closure.”
80
 Here, too, the burden on the court 
seems easily borne. The court must note for the record the nature of the 
disruptive activity to demonstrate its impact on the proceedings and the 
interest served by a potential courtroom closure.
81
 The court must then 
explain what alternatives it can pursue.
82
 There are no particular 
procedures required by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Waller and 
Presley. All these cases require is that the trial court’s conclusions “be 
articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can 
determine whether the closure order was properly entered.”
83
  
While courts have held that “the court must hold a hearing on the 
closure motion,”
84
 the form of hearing is not prescribed. The evidence 
considered may be minimal, as closure may be based on the trial judge’s 
own observations.
85
 No noticed motion is required to precede a closure 
hearing;
86
 it may occur in the course of a trial or other proceedings.
87
 Nor 
do the findings made require a particular form of opinion or order.
88
 Such 
findings may, presumably, be made by a minute entry or issued orally 
from the bench. In short, Waller’s administrative requirements are easily 
 
 
 79. See, e.g., United States v. Laureano-Perez, 797 F.3d 45, 78 (1st Cir. 2015) (addressing 
narrow tailoring factor and approving “district court’s requirement that [defendant’s] wife leave until 
she promised to behave herself”). 
 80. Waller, 467 U.S. at 48. 
 81. See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 215 (2010) (quoting Press–Enterprise Co. v. Superior 
Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)) (“[T]he particular interest, and threat to that interest, must ‘be 
articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the 
closure order was properly entered.’”). 
 82. See id. at 214–15. 
 83. Id. at 215 (quoting Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 510). 
 84. United States v. Rivera, 682 F.3d 1223, 1236 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 85. See State v. Tucker, 290 P.3d 1248, 1259 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (“[A] trial judge’s own 
observations of spectator behavior [may] support closure of trial . . . .”); see also Tinsley v. United 
States, 868 A.2d 867, 876 (D.C. 2005) (“The judge observed [the basis for closure] directly and her 
finding on that score is amply supported by the transcript.”).  
 86. See United States v. Charboneau, Nos. 2:09-cr-7, 2:11-cv-61, 2011 WL 5040717, at *1-*2 
(D.N.D. Oct. 24, 2011), aff’d, 702 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 2013) (motion to close brought by government 
orally, and granted by court orally, after the commencement of trial). 
 87. See id. 
 88. See Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 172 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Waller Court prescribed no 
particular format to which a trial judge must adhere to satisfy the findings requirement.”). 
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satisfied and do not need to be suspended, even tentatively, to 
accommodate the problem of courtroom disruption.
89
 
CONCLUSION 
Cosentino and its progeny take a “short form” approach to determining 
whether to close a courtroom to disruptive spectators. This cursory form of 
review is at odds with the Supreme Court’s holdings; Waller does not 
anticipate exceptions. Moreover, the goals of the right to a public trial 
under the Sixth Amendment are best achieved by applying Waller. Finally, 
the Waller test is easily administered in disruptive spectator situations. 
There is no good reason to apply a courtroom exclusion test for 
“peaceable” spectators that is separate from the one applied to disruptive 
spectators. 
 
 
 89. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 945 N.E.2d 313, 325 n.15 (Mass. 2011) (noting that, in the 
case of a disruption in the courtroom, the reviewing court “will give substantial deference to a judge’s 
determination that the removal of a violent or disruptive spectator from the court room satisfies these 
requirements”). 
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